



NAVY DEPARTMENT  
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS  
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

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2 July 1946

**ONI DECLASSIFICATION/RELEASE INSTRUCTIONS ON FILE**

**From:** Chief of Naval Intelligence  
**To :** Director of Central Intelligence.  
**Via :** Chief of Naval Operations.  
**Subject:** Interim Survey of the Adequacy of Intelligence  
Facilities Related to the National Security, C.I.G.  
Directive No. 12, dated 7 June 1946.  
**Reference:** (a) Acting Chief Support Branch Memo, same Subject,  
dated 13 June 1946.

1. Answers to the queries propounded in reference (a) with  
reference to Naval Intelligence are as follows:

Query a. What was the recommended strength of your intelli-  
gence structure to fulfill the requirements of your  
postwar mission shown by class as follows:

(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Officers	Other Military or Naval Personnel	Professional Civilians	Other Civilians
428	112	169	819

Query b. What is the current authorized strength for intel-  
ligence activities in your department shown by the  
same categories as in a. above?

(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Officers	Other Military or Naval Personnel	Professional Civilians	Other Civilians
390	113	149	581

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It is believed that the reductions indicated under (1) are firm.

The reductions indicated under (3) and (4) are based on pending legislation. The approved figure may vary some from that indicated.

These figures ((b) above) are to be reached upon completion of demobilization, 30 August 1946, and are not the presently assigned strength. Present figures are changing daily due to the roll up schedule and would soon be meaningless. During demobilization only 25 Reserve S(I) Officers are being transferred to the Regular Navy and 58 Reserve S(I) Officers (15 of these in ONI and 43 on foreign posts) are being retained until 1 July 1947. This is resulting in a huge turn-over in ONI. Replacements are from Regular Officers who are untrained in intelligence procedures and techniques, and hence, the quality and quantity of work will correspondingly be adversely affected during the year 1946-1947.

Query 2. What functions and activities of your recommended intelligence structure have been eliminated, delegated or curtailed by reduced authorization?

C BRANCH - (Administration)

- (1) The incorporation of basic material into the Case History (C242) will be considerably curtailed.

D BRANCH - (Domestic)

- (1) Collection of foreign intelligence from within the continental U.S. by locating sources and tabulating and recording them in the Contact Register form will be greatly curtailed.

F BRANCH - (Foreign)

Naval Attache Posts eliminated (2)

Asuncion - Paraguay  
Quito - Ecuador

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**Naval Liaison Posts eliminated (2)**

**Aden - Arabia**

**Hanoi - French Indo China**

Other Naval Attache posts are being reduced in numbers of personnel.

Intelligence studies in connection with planning are delayed. Special and urgent requests are more difficult to meet. Research is greatly retarded.

Technical Intelligence Center (Op-23F2) is currently receiving a constantly increasing flood of technical documents which require processing and dissemination. In this matter, timeliness is of the essence. Associated routine correspondence is assuming a correspondingly sharp increase which originally was possibly not fully appreciated. The Center must now be furnished additional personnel or accept a most undesirable situation which may be of vital concern to the Navy as a whole.

The Graphic Center (Op-23F3) has approximately 6,000,000 unworked prints on hand. The processing of these, plus those being received from the present procurement program, has been seriously slowed down. The processing of these photo prints is essential to the strategic plans and operations of the Navy. The personnel problem has been partially alleviated by the procurement of enlisted men on a temporary basis.

The Washington Document Center (Op-23F5), an interim project which was expected to be completed during the summer of 1946 and consequently was not provided for in the post-war plan, is now known to require until 1 March 1947 for completion. Much valuable material has been collected and should be processed. Its value is adversely affected by delay. They now have 52 officers, 10 enlisted and 3 civilians and need an increase of 18 officers and 7 civilians. Unless an allowance is provided for this duty it will fold up by 20 August 1946 since no post-war complement is authorized. A request for personnel for the project was not granted but is being re-submitted.

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**SECRET****V. BRANCH - (Air)**

**JANAID** - The total personnel required to operate JANAID are given in column one below:

	Total Required		Navy Post War (a)		Navy Present Allowance (b)	
(1)	76	(1)	30	(1)	29	(5 being Marine)
(2)	3	(2)	0	(2)	0	
(3)	67	(3)	50	(3)	25	} 4 more billets may be set up
(4)	61	(4)		(4)	7	

A-2 fills the deficiency created by failure of Navy to provide 50% of required total, which enables JANAID to operate without elimination or curtailment of work. This might be considered a delegation by Navy to A-2.

**Photographic Intelligence Center - PIC**

(a)	(1)	4	(b)	(1)	4
	(2)	7		(2)	7
	(3)	38		(3)	38
	(4)	14		(4)	14

Post-war estimates were low which, together with loss of skilled personnel, has resulted in the following curtailment and elimination:

- (1) Photographic Intelligence publications, research and editing of reports have been curtailed about thirty percent.
- (2) Photogrammetry has been continued at a loss to other departments due to the amount of work in connection with "Operation Cross-roads".
- (3) Terrain model making has been drastically curtailed. At the present time the time required to produce one model is ten times longer than during the peak production period.

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- (4) The work of viewing overseas film by photo interpreters has ceased.

**X BRANCH - (Operational)**

Research seriously curtailed.

- Query d. What reduction in personnel authorizations are contemplated for your intelligence activities in the foreseeable future shown by categories as in g. above?

The demobilized figures were given in Query b. However, these figures are not firm. The final civilian personnel figure in the Naval Appropriation Bill has not been agreed upon in the House and Senate. Also, military personnel may later be changed. The Photo Intelligence Center is a field activity and receives its quota from personnel for home bases. It is expected that its civilian personnel will be reduced 30% prior to September 1946.

- Query e. The reductions indicated in question d. will cause what further reduction, delegation, elimination, or curtailment of functions?

The Photo Intelligence Center will be able only to produce urgent work.

- Query f. What reductions or eliminations of functions have been required in agencies under the purview of your Departmental intelligence function and what is the effect upon the performance of your intelligence mission?

**Joint Intelligence Study Publishing Board.**

A postwar 75% reduction in the personnel engaged in producing JANIS has been accompanied by a 50% decrease in the number of JANIS required per year so that by eliminating some of the less important sections of the intelligence study it has been possible to submit finished JANIS manuscripts on time except as noted in the following paragraph.

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Although ONI does not actually write the Oceanography chapter of JANIS, ONI is responsible for seeing that this section is submitted by the Hydrographic Office in the proper form at the proper time. As a result of a postwar reduction in personnel from twelve to three in Hydrographic's JANIS Oceanography section, they have fallen far behind schedule. The Hydrographic Office now estimates that Chapter III of JANIS 312 which was due on 1 May 1946 will not be ready before 1 October 1946 at the earliest, and that Chapter III of JANIS 40 (RUSSIA) due 1 July 1946 will not be available before 1 November 1946. Unless this condition is corrected the Hydrographic Office will be unable to produce more than two-thirds of the JANIS Oceanography chapters required per year.

The final effect of these personnel reductions upon the performance of JANIS's intelligence mission is difficult to predict but it seems reasonable to assume that if the Hydrographic Office can meet its JANIS schedule that there will be no appreciable damage to the JANIS program. This estimate will not hold true in the event of further reductions in personnel engaged in the production of the Navy's contribution to JANIS.

Query g. In considering all the foregoing factors is the proposed organization and strength adequate to meet your peacetime mission as defined by your own department and N.I.A. policies?

No. For details see answer to query h. below.

Query h. If not, what additional personnel and facilities are required to meet this inadequacy?

To accomplish ONI's intelligence mission during 1947 there is needed the full allowance of military personnel and civilians as given in query g., plus certain additions indicated below:

- (1) Graphic (F3) - Requires an additional 20 civilians for the next ten years to process 6,000,000 unworked photo prints of vital strategic areas.

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- (2) Technical Intelligence (F2) - Requires an increase of 4 officers and 25 civilians to 1 July 1947 to process backlog of Technical Intelligence received during war.
- (3) Washington Document Center (F5) - Requires 70 officers, 10 enlisted and 10 civilians until 1 March 1947.
- (4) Photographic Intelligence Center (PIC) - This is a field activity and its personnel come from Home Bases (Op-413D). The 30% cut ordered in civilian personnel should be restored.
- (5) JNIS - Hydrographic Office - The oceanographers available to work on the oceanography chapter (III) should be increased by five.

Query 1. What action do you recommend be taken by C.I.G. to remedy the situation?

A paper should be prepared presenting the facts disclosed by subject survey together with recommendations which, following approval by the Intelligence Advisory Board, should be submitted to the National Intelligence Authority.

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